| SENDER WILL CHECK CLA͏͏ͰICATION TOP AND BOTTOM |||
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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Chm. / CSS / USIB 1 A04	27 OCT	WB
2		27 Oct	ap
3		28 Oct	WB
4			
5			
6			

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

1—2: How about the attachment! What did the SIC have to say? How much of the dope in this memo can be released to the Community?

2—1 — The attachment referred to is the Airgram attached to the DIA memo.

— All the info in this memo can be released. ⬚ would probably give plenty more if asked.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
CIA Member, 1 A04	27 OCT 1970

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27 OCT 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Computer Security Subcommittee
United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT   : International Computer Institute

REFERENCE   : Memorandum dated 26 August 1970 to
Chairman, USIB Security Committee
from Defense Intelligence Agency
member, Subject: Possible Target for
Hostile Espionage

     1. In answer to your request of 16 October 1970 made at
the Computer Security Subcommittee meeting thirty-five, the above
referenced memorandum and the attached United States State Depart-
ment Airgram dated 12 August 1970 was distributed to appropriate
components within the Central Intelligence Agency.

     2. As a result of this distribution, it has been determined
that the original airgram was distributed to approximately 15
components within the Central Intelligence Agency at the time of
its original issue, 12 August 1970.

     3. The Office of Scientific Intelligence/DDS&T has been
following developments of this Institute through succeeding United
States State Department airgram traffic since August 1970.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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4.   A representative of the Office of Scientific Intelligence advised that the United States State Department has decided to participate in the International Computer Institute in as passive a mode as possible.   To date the United States has avoided sending any technically skilled representatives to these meetings; representatives have been sent from the United States Embassy in Paris.   It has been indicated that the United States will not contribute any major financial and/or technical assistance to this Institute.

5.   It is the feeling of representatives within CIA that this International Computer Institute would not offer Communist Bloc countries any new avenues to the United States technology; however, it may add more volume to their present collection efforts.

6.   The present policy being followed by the Coordinating Committee (COCOM) of Mutual Defense Assistance, a group which consists of all NATO nations and Japan, limits export of United States computer equipment to the IBM 360/40 series and below and equipment of similar capability manufactured by the other United States computer corporations.   Any machinery exceeding the capabilities of that noted above must be approved by COCOM.   Unfortunately, COCOM regulates the export of computer hardware only, software export is not regulated.   Communist Bloc countries presently own United States manufactured computer equipment such as the CDC 1604 and some of the smaller IBM models.   As owners of these equipments, they are entitled to participate in users groups where software problems are discussed and members offer solutions to these problems on a mutual exchange basis.   It is assumed that participation in these groups such as SHARE is a very productive source for the Communist Bloc countries in the computer software field.

7.   In view of the above information, it would appear that the proposed Institute would be a target for collection activities by Communist Bloc countries.   However, it would not appear to be a prime target for major collection activities when compared with the other efforts now being made by these countries.   If further information and/or guidance is required from CIA, the undersigned

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would be available to pursue this matter further.

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CIA Member
Computer Security Subcommittee

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